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Abstract—This paper introduces a formal metamodel for the 
specification of security policies for workflows in online service 
systems designed to be suitable for the modeling and analysis of 
complex business-related rules as well as traditional access 
control. A translation of the model into a colored Petri net is 
shown and an example of policy for an online banking system is 
described. By writing predicates for querying the resulting state- 
space of the Petri net, a connection between the formalized model 
and a higher-level description of the security policy can be made, 
indicating the feasibility of the intended method for validating 
such descriptions. Thanks to the independent nature among tasks 
related to different business services, represented by restrictions 
in the information flow within the metamodel, the state-space 
may be fractioned for analysis, avoiding the state-space explosion 
problem. Related existing models are discussed, pointing the gain 
in expressiveness of business rules and the analysis of insecure 
state paths rather than simply insecure states in the proposed 
model. The successful representation and analysis of the policy 
from the example combined with reasonings for the general case 
attest the adequacy of the proposed approach for its intended 
application. 
Keywords-security policies; modeling and analysis; colored 
Petri nets; business workflows 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In spite of the many advances in security policies 
description, modeling and validation, designing secure systems 
under security constraints involving business parameters can 
lead to large models that are unsuitable for analysis. 
Additionally, descriptions of security policies based on entities 
with a high level of abstraction result in models distant from 
the system’s implementation, potentially leading to the 
inclusion of vulnerabilities in the translation or, if methodically 
or automatically translated, may still lead to inefficient 
software. 
Our objective is to define a modeling and analysis strategy 
that best suits the validation of security policies meant 
primarily for online services systems and that properly handles 
rules heavily dependent of workflow states and business 
parameters. 
We begin by situating the problem from a communication- 
based view of a workflow system. Next, the metamodel 
developed is defined and its notable features discussed, and 
finally, the process of analysis is considered leading to the 
comparison with other approaches and the conclusions on the 
adequacy of the process. 
Figure 1.  Model of communication with the WFMS. 
II. DESCRIBING WORKFLOWS 
The use of Petri nets (PN) [1] for modeling business 
workflows has been widely accepted for years, mainly thanks 
to their mathematically sound nature combined with their large 
power of representation of state-based scenarios [2]. The 
extended concept of colored Petri nets (CPN) [3] enhances the 
expressiveness of models and simplifies their analysis, 
especially when aided by tools such as the CPN Tools software 
[4]. In [5] these characteristics of PN have been exploited as 
the authors devised the possibility of linking workflows to 
multilevel secure environments, thus treating problems of 
authorization within such workflows as reachability problems 
in their corresponding modeled Petri net [6]. This approach 
makes it possible to formally analyze whether a security policy 
is respected in a given scenario. 
Regardless of its structure, a workflow management system 
(WFMS) may be seen, from its inputs and outputs point of 
view, as an entity receiving sequences of messages, or requests, 
from the interacting parties that alter its inner state. For the 
specification of a security policy for such a system, the most 
important feature is whether or not it authorizes each received 
request. 
Figure 1 indicates the structure of a request. The interacting 
party that issues the request will be referred to as user. Each 
request specifies a desired action, which is subject to security 
constraints. The set of actions related to the same high-level 
business process form a task. The parameters specify the scope 
of the action, and may be thought of as lists of key-value pairs.  
By restricting the mathematical domains for those parts of a 
request, one may define the set of possible sequences of 
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requests for performing tasks that we shall call protocol of the 
WFMS. Therefore, the description of the sequences of 
messages that lead to authorized or forbidden actions constitute 
a formal language, which we’ll refer to as the high-level 
description of the policy in the context of our model. 
Based on these formulations, our strategy for validating 
security policies for WFMS is: 
1) Determine the protocol for a given system; 
2) Describe the security policy in terms of the 
authorized and unauthorized sequences of requests; 
3) Model the security policy in terms of a special 
metamodel; and 
4) Translate the high-level description of the policy into 
predicates that query such metamodel’s state-space 
for validating that it fully represents the described 
security policy.  
This paper discusses the design of this metamodel, that 
must be capable of modeling complex security rules related to 
business parameters and must also feature an architecture that 
facilitates the analysis of the models. The analysis suggested in 
the last step of the strategy defined above is not a complete 
one. It is enough to demonstrate that models designed in terms 
of this metamodel properly represent the security policies they 
were meant to represent, and that the model’s architecture 
supports analyses based on querying its state- space. 
Additionally, since the metamodel models a complete and 
consistent set of rules by design, inconsistencies in the rules 
that guide the query-based analysis will be discovered. 
However, demonstrating the completeness of this set of rules 
would require other verifications that although haven’t been 
shown in the scope of this work, also rely on observing aspects 
of the state-space and can be achieved with no changes to the 
metamodel. 
We focus on verifying that: (a) the metamodel conceived is 
capable of representing the security policies of the desired 
scenario without compromising the feasibility of the analysis, 
and (b) there is a method for translating the typical sequences 
of messages that will define rules in WFMS into queries that 
may be designed in the realization of the model using CPN 
Tools. 
A. Example: Policy For Online Banking System 
We demonstrate the ideas proposed with the help of an 
example of security policy meant for regulating the clients’ 
access to an online banking system. The financial services 
selected for the example are a simple balance check and an 
electronic funds transfer (EFT) operation. These two, along 
with the login and logout operations suffice to demonstrate the 
methodology to be followed and the power and limitations of 
the modeling. 
In this example, each bank account holds two users, one 
called “master” and another called “helper”. Users 
authenticate via a login procedure where only a password is 
provided for the sake of simplicity. The balance check is a 
simple read-only transaction whereas the EFT requires more 
complex rules that demonstrate how to represent business-
specific scenarios. 
The protocol for the example is given below (arrows 
indicate workflow sequence): 
Login 
Actions: “idtf” (acc, usr) → “auth” (pass) 
“idtf” Identifies the account and user for logging in. “auth” 
sends the password for the (user, account) pair. 
Balance 
Actions: “balance” 
A single message for requesting balance, dependent on the 
login. 
ETF 
Actions: “transf_home” → “transf_forms” (acc, val) → 
“transf_auth” (idt, pass) 
“transf_home” represents the request for a funds transfer 
page containing the required forms. “transf_forms” 
represents the sending of those forms including account to 
receive funds and value. “transf_auth” represents the 
sending of the necessary credentials for confirming the 
operation. 
The rules of the policy are as follows: 
1) For a login, the requesting user must not have completed 
a login before under the requested account, unless it has 
completed a logout in between them. 
2) Failing to provide the correct password to the login on 
three consecutive occasions blocks the access to the 
system. 
3) Only logged users may access the account balance. 
4) Only logged users may access the electronic funds 
transfer operation. 
5) Only the “master” user may complete electronic funds 
transfer operation; the “helper” user may only format 
them for later approval. 
6) The amount to transfer to a non-registered account added 
to the total amount already transferred to non-registered 
accounts must not exceed the limit of $500. 
7) The amount to transfer to a registered account added to 
the total amount already transferred must not exceed the 
limit of $1500. 
Each of these may be specified in terms of authorized and 
denied sequences of messages, as will be discussed in the 
analysis of the example. A small CPN implements the sending 
of sequences of messages to the metamodel, optionally 
regulating stop criteria. 
III. THE METAMODEL 
The metamodel must provide an abstraction for the inner 
state of the WFMS as well as include the mechanisms by 
means of which a modeled policy shall define the logic of 
authorization of workflows and evolution of the inner state 
abstraction. 
(IJCSIS) International Journal of Computer Science and Information Security,  
Vol. 11, No. 4, April 2013 
 
Figure 2.  Entity-relationship diagram for the metamodel. 
For defining the inner state model, some assumptions on 
the type of system under discussion are pertinent. Unlike many 
workflow systems in the literature, online services systems are 
marked by a wide range of possible operations, or tasks, and 
limited shared resources. In the context of the metamodel, the 
account will act as the only shared resource repository. That’ll 
prove not to be too limiting, since an unlimited number of 
parameters may be modeled as resources in each account. 
Figure 2 presents the metamodel as an entity-relationship 
model. A user, accessing an account, initiates a session. By 
means of this session, the requests are issued. Every account 
holds parameters relative to each performable task. There are 
also specific parameters for each session and each request. 
Every triple (user, account, task) is assigned a certain clearance 
level, and each possible action is associated with a minimum 
clearance level needed for its authorization. Besides that, every 
action is also assigned a constraint function that holds the 
authorization logic for that action in terms of the requesting 
entities and their parameters. The definitions concerning a 
security policy modeled on top of this metamodel should, 
therefore, be achieved by providing values to the depicted 
attributes — parameters, clearance levels and constraint 
functions. Taking its formal interpretation as explained in [7], 
the formal definition of the metamodel follows. 
Definition 1: 
 Let User, Account, Session, Request, Action and Task 
be entity sets; 
 Let UAS  User × Account × Session be a relation 
assigning a session to a user and account; 
 Let UAT  User × Account × Task be a relation 
assigning a task to a user and account; 
 Let SR  Session × Request be a relation assigning a 
request to a session; 
 Let RA  Request × Action be a relation assigning an 
action to a request; 
 Let Tact  Task × Action be a relation assigning an 
action to a task; 
 Let TAcc  Task × Account be a relation assigning an 
account to a task; 
 Let Key, Value, Clearance, Integer and String be 
value sets, with Key  String, Clearance  Integer 
and Value  Integer  String  2Integer  2String; 
 Let Parameter  Key × Value be a relation assigning a 
value to a key; 
 Let PS: Session → 2
Parameter
 be a function that 
represents a session’s Parameters attribute by 
mapping a Session to a set of Parameter (to be defined 
in the metamodel implementation); 
 Likewise, let PR: Request → 2
Parameter
 and PTA: TAcc 
→ 2Parameter be functions representing the analogue 
attributes; and  
 Let ClA: Action → Clearance and ClUAT: UAT → 
Clearance be functions representing the Clearance 
Level attributes;  
Given the above definitions, one may formalize the 
authorization of a request: 
Definition 2: 
 Let ≥Cl  Clearance × Clearance be a partial order on 
the set of Clearances; 
 Let CA: Action → (2
Parameter
 × 2
Parameter
 × 2
Parameter
 × 
User × Account → {true, false}) be a higher-order 
function mapping an Action to a Boolean-valued 
constraint function (referenced ahead as fA);  
 Let ψ(r): Request → {true, false} be an auxiliary 
predicate such that:  
ψ(r) := { ClUAT(uat) ≥Cl ClA(a) | a  Action : RA(r, a) 
 s  Session : SR(s, r)  u  User, acc  Account 
: UAS(u, acc, s)  t  Task : TAct(t, a)  uat = (u, 
acc, t) : UAT(uat) } 
 and 
 Let φ(r): Request → {true, false} be a predicate such 
that: 
φ(r) := { CA(act) (PR(r), PTA(τ), PS(s), u, acc)  ψ(r) | 
act  Action : RA(r, act)  s  Session : SR(s, r)  
u  User, acc  Account : UAS(u, acc, s)  t  
Task : TAct(t, act)  τ = (t, acc) : TAcc(τ) } 
Then, a request r is said to be authorized if, and only if, it 
satisfies the predicate φ(r). 
Predicate ψ(r) is the authorization stage that implements 
multilevel access control by checking whether a certain user 
working with a certain account has enough clearance for 
performing its desired action in the context of that specific task.  
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Figure 3.  Stages of the processing of a request.
The constraint functions fA, defined for each action in the 
model, is the placeholder for any complex business logic to be 
included in a security rule. In a strict view, fA is capable of 
including the functionality that ψ(r) provides, but having a 
separate mechanism for multilevel access control simplifies the 
modeling given its frequent usage. 
Besides the authorization stage, a state update stage is 
desired, as represented by the flowchart in figure 3. By 
including updates to the model’s attributes, decisions regarding 
the authorization of subsequent requests may differ from 
previous ones, effectively making the model dynamic. There 
are three updates contemplated by the metamodel: update of 
the (account, task) parameters, update of the (user, account, 
task) clearances and update of the session as a whole (entities, 
relations and parameters). Adopting a superscript ∆ as notation 
for values during the processing of a request r and ∆ + 1 for 
their updated values during processing of the request that 
follows r, the update rules are formally defined as follows: 
Definition 3: Let AP: Task × 2
Parameter
, then we define the 
account parameters update function fB: 
Parameter
ParameterParameter
2
TaskAccountUser222:  P
A
Bf  
And so, for the account acc processed in ∆ and t  Task: 
),,),()),,(,(),((),(
Task
1+
taccusPaccPrPfacctP STARBTA



 


where r is the request processed in ∆, s  Session : SR(s, r) and 
u  User : UAS(u, acc, s). 
For any other acc′  Account, t, ),(),(
1
cactPcactP TATA 

. 
This means that only parameters relative to the account that 
issued the request may be updated, however parameters from 
different tasks than the one processed may also suffer changes, 
therefore allowing some dependence between tasks in the 
security policy design. 
For the update of (user, account) clearances, we define: 
Definition 4: Let UAC: Task × Clearance, then we define 
the clearances update function fC: 
ClearanceTask
AccountUser2222:
ParameterParameterParameter

 C
UA
Cf  
and so, for entities related to the processed request in the same 
terms as in the previous definition, t  Task: 
),,)),,,(,(
),(),,(),((),,(
1
taccuaccuCl
sPacctPrPftaccuCl
UAT
Task
STARCUAT




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
  
For any other acc′  Account, u′  User, t 
),,(),,(
1
tcacuCltcacuCl UATUAT 

. 
Thus, analogously as with fB, a policy may alter the 
clearances for any task, but only for the pair (user, account) 
that issued the request. Finally, for updating the session related 
elements: 
Definition 5: We define the session update function fD: 
ParameterSession
ParameterParameterParameter
222Session
AccountUser222:


SR
Df  
And so, for entities related to the processed request, 
).,,),(
),,(),((),,Session(
111
saccusP
acctPrPfPSR
S
TARDS



 
Each of the function kinds fB, fC and fD must have a 
definition in the metamodel implementation for appliance 
following authorized requests and another for appliance 
following denied requests, as denoted in the flowchart. 
As a final remark, one may notice that security policies 
defined according to this metamodel will be inherently 
consistent, since only a single function for each purpose — 
authorization or state updates — may be defined for each 
action defined in the protocol; complete, and non-redundant, 
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since the logic of authorization is bound to all possible 
interactions with the system, instead of to rules encompassing 
sets of interactions, which could leave gaps (incompleteness) or 
overlap (redundancy). However, precisely for not being a rule-
oriented design, the modeled policy must be proven equivalent 
to our high-level specification, which is the purpose of the 
analysis. 
A. The CPN Model 
The translation of the conceptual metamodel conceived into 
a CPN model is rather straightforward. 
Figure 4 shows the network that implements the 
metamodel. The central transition tagged “execution” handles 
the entire process seen in the flowchart from figure 3. The input 
requests are withdrawn from a queue implemented in the place 
called “server queue” and responses are sent to another queue 
in the place “server output”. Session identifications are 
generated in the place “new session pool”, and the 
identification number is consumed only in case a new session is 
processed. The smaller transition, tagged “session invalid” is 
triggered only in case a certain session identification received 
is not found in the open sessions pool, located in the place 
named “open sessions”. That mechanism for the invalid 
sessions is achieved using a lower priority for the firing of that 
transition. The tokens stored in the place “open sessions” 
include four pieces of information: the identification of the 
session, the user associated with it, the account also associated 
with it and the parameters of the session. The remaining places, 
“account data access” and “user data access” hold the 
parameters linked to each account for every task and the (user, 
account, task) clearance levels, respectively. The guard 
function for the execution transition ensures that the selected 
session corresponds to the one referenced by the parameter 
with key equal to “sess” in the request, when it is present. The 
code region for the same transition distinguishes new sessions 
from sessions retrieved from the “open sessions” place and 
executes the authorization function determining the decision 
for the request in process. The authorization function is 
responsible for both stages defined in the flowchart — the first 
one, ψ(r), referencing the clearance required for the action, and 
the second one referencing the constraint function for the 
action. Finally, the output arcs take care of the update of each 
entity by calling an execution function which references all the 
right functions defined in the policy, using the result of the 
authorization function to determine whether to invoke 
functions for denial or allowance of execution. The output arc 
leading to the output queue calls a function that assembles the 
reply message, also for denial or allowance accordingly. 
B. Implementing the Example Policy 
As had been explained in the introduction of the 
metamodel, the security policy is entirely described for the 
model by establishing the values for all attributes from the 
entity- relationship model provided. Table I shows a simplified 
view of that description as it is implemented for the rules 
above. 
TABLE I.  SUMMARY OF MODELED POLICY 
Action Task Clearance fA fB fC fD 
idtf login 0 X  X X 
auth login 0 X X X  
balance balance 1 X    
transf_home eft 1 X   X 
transf_forms eft 1 X X  X 
transf_auth eft 2 X X   
logout logout 0  X X X 
 
The “Clearance” column indicates the clearance level 
required for the pair (user, account) to perform the action 
required by the request. All pairs initiate runs of the Petri net 
with value 0 (zero), gaining higher clearance levels as they log 
in or perform other actions. The function fA is the constraint 
function that determines whether or not the action may be 
completed. In the table, cells marked with an “X” indicate that 
the evaluation of a function of the type given by that column is 
necessary for actions of the type indicated in the row. For 
functions fB (account parameters update), fC (clearances update) 
and fD (session update), an empty cell indicates that for that 
action, an identity function is used for that feature, which 
means no change is necessary for that entity. The indication of 
functions for updates in case of denial of intent are omitted to 
avoid cluttering, but they shall be necessary at most for the 
same cases as their allowed update counterparts. 
It can be noted from table I that, for instance, the “idtf” 
action requires a constraint function, a clearance update 
function and a session update function, but doesn’t require an 
account parameters update function. Indeed, the clearance 
update function is needed because the clearance for all other 
tasks is reduced below zero, since the session is about to 
become associated to a user and account that haven’t been 
validated yet. The session update function is needed to indicate 
which user and account the session is attempting to 
impersonate. The constraint function is necessary to verify if a 
free session identifier for allocation, and finally the account 
parameters shouldn’t be updated, since at this point it is yet 
unknown whether the user actually has access to the account it 
claims to have (the limitation of the model of only being able to 
update the account associated to the running session prevents 
updates on any valid accounts at this point, since there is no 
account linked to the session until that very update that fD from 
“idtf” intends to execute). A sample of an authorization 
function (fA) for the “transf_auth” action is given below: 
fun transf_auth_funA (m:request, s:session, q:params) = 
let 
  val password = StringInParam(getOpt(valueForKey 
    ("u"^(toString(usrNumber(#3 s)))) (q),ValString(""))) 
  val registered = IntListInParam(getOpt( 
    valueForKey "registered" (q), ValIntList([]))) 
  val avLimit = IntInParam(getOpt( 
    valueForKey "avLimit" (q), ValInt(50000))) 
  val avLimitRegistered = IntInParam(getOpt( 
    valueForKey "avLimitReg" (q), ValInt(150000))) 
  val tid = IntInParam(getOpt( 
    valueForKey "tid"(#3 m), ValInt(~1))) 
  val destAcc = AccInParam(getOpt(valueForKey 
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if (s' = ~1)
then 1`(~1, acc(0), usr(0), [])
else empty
r_l2
r_l2^^
[reply
(req,403,SessInReq(req))]
r_l req::r_l
r_l2
if(authorized)
then r_l2^^[reply(req, 200, s)]
else r_l2^^[reply(req, 403, s)]
(acc_, usr_, (#2 (actionExec(authorized, req, (s'', acc_, usr_, par_), cL, opParL))))
(acc_, usr_, cL)
(acc_, (#1 (actionExec(authorized, req, (s'', acc_, usr_, par_), cL, opParL))))
(acc_, opParL)
actionSessExec(
authorized, req,
(s'', acc_, usr_, par_), 
cL, opParL)
(s', acc_, usr_, par_)
s::il
r_l
req::r_l
session
invalid
P_LOW
execution
[(SessInReq(req) = s')]
input (req, s, s', acc_, usr_, par_, cL, opParL);
output (s'', authorized);
action
(let 
val s_out = if s' = ~1 then s else s' 
in
      (s_out, aut(req, (s_out, acc_, usr_, par_), cL, opParL))
end);
user
account
clearances
usrBD
usr_clear
account
data
dataBD
data_acc
open
sessions
(~1, acc(0), usr(0), [])
session
new
session
pool
[1,2,3,4]
int_list
server
output
I/O
request_list
server
queue
I/O
request_list
upAvSess(authorized, req, 
(s'', acc_, usr_, par_),
s, il, cL, opParL)
 
Figure 4.  The colored Petri net for the metamodel
 (("tr"^(toString(tid)))^"_to") (q), ValAcc(acc(0)))) 
  val value_ = IntInParam(getOpt(valueForKey 
    (("tr"^(toString(tid)))^"_val") (q), ValInt(~1))) 
in 
  value_ > 0 
andalso 
  destAcc <> acc(0) 
andalso 
  destAcc <> (#2 s) 
andalso 
  if (mem registered (accNumber(destAcc))) 
  then avLimitRegistered + avLimit >= value_ 
  else avLimit >= value_ 
andalso 
  StringInParam(getOpt(valueForKey "auth" (#3 m), 
    ValString(""))) = password 
andalso 
  sessOK(m, s, q) 
end; 
The function’s input matches the definition for constraint 
functions: the value m holds the request parameters, q holds the 
parameters for the pair (account, task) and s is a triple 
containing user, account and session parameters. The auxiliary 
values password, registered, avLimit and soforth are 
all extracted from the account parameters for the EFT task (q) 
except for tid which is a parameter from the request. tid 
identifies the EFT previously prepared for execution, and, 
therefore, its parameters of value and recipient account are 
located by referencing it. Default values are specified for all 
parameters in case they aren’t found. The authorization is 
granted given that the transaction value is larger than zero, the 
recipient account is valid and isn’t the session’s own account, 
the password provided in the request matches the saved 
password for that user in the account’s parameters, and the 
account’s limits are greater than the transaction value, with the 
appropriate limit calculated depending on whether the recipient 
account is registered or not. This sample fully demonstrates the 
complexity that can be achieved in the semantics of the rules 
thanks to the minimal restrictions provided by the metamodel. 
IV. MODEL ANALYSIS 
A. Defining Rules Precisely 
The main goal of the metamodel analysis as we have 
conducted it is demonstrating that it fully represents the 
security policy described by means of accepted and rejected 
sequences of requests. In order to indicate these sequences and 
define rules precisely, a notation is introduced. The expression 
below indicates rule (1) from the example written using such 
notation: 
(u, a)“auth”(sess = s)()A → ¬((u, a)“logout”(sess = s)()A)  (u, 
a)“idtf”(acc = a, usr = u)D 
α  Rδ means that if conditions α are respected, decision δ 
must be applied to request R. R
D
 indicates the denial of R. R
A
 
indicates the authorization of R. Operator “Q → R” indicates R 
has been processed after Q (not necessarily immediately after). 
Operator ¬R indicates R has not been processed. The first pair 
of parentheses after each action name encloses request 
parameters and the second, response parameters (hence, there 
is no second pair of parentheses for the request under analysis). 
Thus, the rule reads: “Requests from user u for action idtf on 
account a shall be denied if there has been a previous 
authorized processing of an action auth for the same user and 
account in a session s that hasn’t been followed by an 
authorized request for action logout, also in session s.” 
It is not our purpose to formalize this notation in this paper. 
We employ it simply as an intermediate step for designing 
predicates over state-the space that capture the semantics of the 
rules written in natural language. 
And so, for the remaining rules from the given example of 
policy: 
2) (u, a)“auth”()()D → ¬((u, a)“auth”()()A) →  
(u, a)“auth”()()D → ¬((u, a)“auth”()()A) → 
(u, a)“auth”()()D  (u, a)“_”()D 
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3) ¬((u, a)“auth”(sess = s)()A )  
(u, a)“balance”(sess = s)D  
4) ¬((u, a)“auth”(sess = s)()A )  
(u, a)“transf_home”(sess = s)D  
5) (u, a)“transf_auth”()D, u = “helper” 
6) [(u, b)“transf_forms”(val = v, dest = a)(idt = t)A → 
(u, b)“transf_auth”(idt = t)A]i → 
(u, b)“transf_forms”(val = vk, dest = ak)(idt = tk)
A
  
(u, b)“transf_auth”(idt = tk )
D
, 
:500)Ra|v(vRa  
i
biikbk  
(“registered”, Rb) PTA(ETF, b) 
7) [(u, b)“transf_forms”(val = v, dest = a)(idt = t)A → 
(u, b)“transf_auth”(idt = t)A]i → 
(u, b)“transf_forms”(val = vk, dest = ak)(idt = tk)
A
  
(u, b)“transf_auth”(idt = tk )
D
, 
:1500vvRa 
i
ikbk  
(“registered”, Rb) PTA(ETF, b) 
For properly analyzing the conceived scenario, besides these 7 
rules, each restriction on workflow sequence must also 
generate an additional rule, stating, for instance, that the 
approval of an EFT (action “transf_auth”) must always follow 
its definition (action “transf_forms”). 
B. Writing State-Space Predicates 
Given a set of initial conditions, namely the pre- 
programmed parameters of each user and account and the set of 
all (relevant) possible requests for the WFMS, the resulting 
CPN of the model can be analyzed to generate the graph of all 
possible states it may assume. Since the number of these states 
is most likely too large to allow a manual analysis, CPN Tools 
allows the modeler to automate the search for states with 
specific properties by executing queries that describe these 
properties and filter the state-space. 
Every security rule described as above states a sufficient 
though not necessary condition for the outcome of the request 
to which it refers. Consequently, if a rule states that a request R 
is to be denied when it satisfies the conditions α, to test that 
rule one must search for states where R satisfies the conditions 
α, and yet it has been authorized. Since the state-space analysis 
is designed to cover all possible situations, if no such state can 
be found, then the rule has been followed. 
In CPN Tools, the function PredAllNodes allows one to 
filter the generated state-space according to some predicate 
function, usually stating properties of a marking. Also, 
combining functions InArcs and SourceNodes, one may 
obtain a list of the immediate predecessor states to any desired 
state. Applying these recursively, it is possible to generate the 
ordered lists of all acyclical paths leading to the states that 
satisfy the right-hand side of any rule. With the help of 
functions PredAllSccs and SccToNodes, it is also 
possible to determine all sets of states forming cycles in the 
state-space graph. Therefore, testing any rule expressed in our 
given notation becomes a matter of verifying the presence or 
absence of states representing the rule’s restrictions within the 
lists for some or all paths leading to a set of states. 
For most rules, however, some simplification is possible 
and desirable for optimizing performance. The following 
pseudocode shows the structure of the query for rule (7), which 
is a good example of a highly complex rule. 
1:  auths ← all states where a “transf_auth” action has been 
authorized 
2:  for all states s1 in auths do 
3:   if s1 is in a state-space cycle then 
4:    add s1 to insecure_states 
5:   end if 
6:   for all states s2 in acyclical paths p from s1 back to 1 do 
7:    if a “transf_auth” action has been authorized in s2 and 
account(s2) = account(s1) and user(s2) = user(s1) then 
8:     add parameter tid from s2 to list t  
9:    end if 
10:    if a “transf_forms” action has been authorized in s2 and 
account(s2) = account(s1) and user(s2) = user(s1) and 
parameter acc from s2 is in the registered accounts list 
from account(s1) and parameter tid from s2 is in list t 
then 
11:     limit_consumed ← limit_consumed + (parameter val 
from s2) 
12:     remove tid from list t 
13:   end if 
14:  end for 
15:  largest_limit_consumed = max(limit_consumed) in p  
16:  if largest_limit_consumed > 1500 then 
17:   add s1 to insecure_states  
18:  end if 
19: end for 
20: return insecure_states 
The syntax and auxiliary functions for navigating the state- 
space are all properly documented in [8]. 
With this logic for rule validation, there is no need for the 
modeler to tamper with the state definitions adding extra 
information to function as clues for identifying the trail of 
states while analyzing a single PN marking. Such a technique 
will always increase the total number of states in an analysis. 
Another avoided pitfall is the writing of predicates that reason 
about inner states of the model linked to decisions about 
modeling rather than system specification — doing so 
increases the risk of using false arguments to attest properties 
of the model. 
C. Preventing State-Space Explosion 
In many workflow systems, as is the case in [6], [9] among 
others, the possible sequences of actions that can be requested 
by a user are few, and may be completely included in the 
model. However, there are systems where a wider variety of 
possibilities exist, causing any attempt to model all possible 
workflows to generate a state-space too large for analysis. For 
such cases, the analysis must be subdivided in a way that 
combining each division’s independent analysis yields the 
same conclusions as the analysis made as a whole. 
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It is reasonable to assume that, for most systems, different 
tasks often consist of independent workflows and, therefore, 
tasks or groups of tasks could be the pivotal elements of the 
necessary subdivision. Our metamodel, expecting such a need, 
effectively separates the data domains that constitute the inner 
state of each task. Let us recall that the decision regarding a 
request in a WFMS is a function of the parameters from a pair 
(account, task), whereas the update function for these 
parameters is executed for all tasks. In practice, this means that 
when updating a state, a request from a certain task may or may 
not alter the parameters for another task at will, but the decision 
is always based solely on parameters exclusive for the task that 
encompasses the processing request. 
By cleverly comparing the parameters of a task in the states 
immediately preceding and immediately following the 
processing of a request, we may conclude whether that request 
causes a change in state in the scope of the task observed. If by 
doing so for both an authorization and a denial of the same 
action, we verify that the parameters remain unchanged, than 
that action is proven independent of the observed task, and may 
be excluded from the analysis of that particular task. 
Exceptions must be made for the cases when the action alters 
the session parameters, which are shared globally by all tasks, 
and, more subtly, when that action influences the outcome of a 
different action, which in turn affects the task under analysis. 
As an additional simplification, unless the policy contains 
some rule such as rule (2) from the example, where 
consequences of a denied request are specified, the update 
functions for denied cases should not alter the state of the 
system and, therefore, the receiving of a denied response could 
be used as condition for terminating a workflow, preventing 
several cyclical paths from being calculated and speeding up 
the evaluation of predicates. 
Preventing state-space explosion involves making 
intelligent assumptions or simplifications during the modeling 
[10] and the acceptable limits of state-space size and 
calculation time depend on the application. Merely as a 
reference, table II lists the number of states generated for 
various conditions in the example policy based on an initial set 
of 7 well-formed requests, one of each existing actions, 
requested by a “master” user in account 1. 
The results shown indicate that the state-space is generally 
more sensitive to an increase in the number of different 
accounts than request variations on its workload. That fact may 
be understood as the effect of the several different intermediate 
states caused by the multiple possible orderings in which each 
request may be sent to the server when many clients are 
accessing it simultaneously. It is important to notice, though, 
that tolerating larger workflows for a single client is a very 
positive feature, since it allows the conception of test cases that 
test the dependency between sequences of operations in the 
model, which is the likely case where no subdivision in the 
suggested fashion is possible. Putting together that fact, the 
various possible mechanisms discussed for reducing state- 
space size, the treatability of the general structure of queries for 
rules, and the successful analysis of the example case, there is 
good evidence of the adequacy of the modeled policy for the 
intended analysis. 
TABLE II.  NUMBER OF STATE-SPACE NODES FOR DIFFERENT 
WORKLOAD CONDITIONS 
Workload condition 
(in relation to base case) 
Request 
variations 
States 
Base case 7 1122 
Wrong login password 7 86 
Wrong EFT password 7 470 
“helper” user 7 470 
EFT of $500 instead of $250 7 860 
+ Request for “transf_auth” with other “tid” 8 1845 
Two previous tests combined 8 1113 
Misc. variations of parameters 14 58911 
Base requests also for “helper” on same acc. 14 13997 
Base requests also for “master” on other acc. 14 104320 
 
V. RELATED WORK 
A significant difference between our approach and all 
others in the line of [6], is that their analyses [11], [12] are 
focused on finding a state with insecure properties whereas 
ours deter- mines an insecure condition by locating an insecure 
state path. By adopting this concept, we introduce a trade-off 
between state-space graph search time and state-space size, 
which, to our knowledge, hasn’t been investigated in the 
literature for this area. 
The definition of a value dependency given in [11] suits our 
ultimate CPN translation of a complex business rule, however, 
modeling as they propose requires knowledge of all possible 
outcomes of calculations at design time making the task 
impractical whereas, thanks to the concept of colored tokens, 
we are able to differentiate states assigning the result of a 
calculation to a token simplifying the design. 
Other differences include our definition of a metamodel in a 
higher level of abstraction, which allowed us to adopt certain 
general assumptions in the analysis. As a side note, the 
example model from [12] of a document release process could 
be modeled using our strategy by representing the document 
resource as a property in an editing task within an account, and 
setting its value to represent the user currently allowed to 
perform actions in its workflow. 
A different approach, adopted in SecureUML [13], aims at 
dealing with complex systems security by orienting their 
design and translating the resulting specification into a formal 
security policy model. Even though their metamodel is 
generally more comprehensive than ours, it is not targeted at 
dealing with workflows and complex business logic. Moreover, 
the analysis they propose [14] mentions that support for 
handling system state, which could include the analysis of 
workflows as we propose, would require reasoning about 
consequences of their specification’s formulas, and has been 
left for future work. 
More recently, a process of analysis of RBAC models [15] 
in workflows using CPN has been described [16] that shares 
many characteristics with ours. Much like with the previous 
examples, this formalization also lacks the ability to express 
constraints related to the business parameters. 
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Finally, in [9], the authors define an approach to testing 
which closely resembles ours, in that the generation of mutants 
is equivalent to our enumeration of possible input requests. 
Besides the omission in treatment of business-related rules as 
in the previous models, the authors mention that for larger 
systems, analyzing reachability trees could require dividing the 
system into independent submodules but provide no insight 
into how such division could be handled. By introducing the 
notion of restrict data domains for state updates, we have taken 
a larger step in providing an orientation for the division of 
these larger systems. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The success in modeling the security policy from the 
example indicates that we have achieved a definition for the 
metamodel that satisfies the requirement of expressing complex 
authorization logic linked to parameters from the business 
model. The communication-based description of rules and its 
translation into predicates of the model’s state-space provide a 
viable method of ensuring the model’s proper behavior and 
guaranteeing consistency in a given set of rules. The state- 
space explosion problem was avoided by means of a 
combination of minimal metamodel design, state-space queries 
that include conditions on paths to states, and especially a 
roadmap for subdivision of analysis with guaranteed 
equivalence of results. 
The method of analysis discussed is sufficient to attest 
whether a modeled security policy is consistent. However, 
demonstrating its completeness and non-redundancy requires 
not only the conclusion that the metamodel fully represents the 
policy’s description as also that they are equivalent. A 
possibility within the existing framework is to analyze the 
metamodel state-space and derive a set of rules from the 
behavior it implies, later matching those rules to the original 
policy description. Since the proposed definition of metamodel 
also supports that method of analysis, we have achieved our 
goal of providing an approach to modeling security policies 
rich with business logic that is suitable for a complete analysis. 
We believe that security policy models built with the 
formalization provided here result in specifications that 
represent systems behavior in a low level of abstraction, 
simplifying their implementation in actual code and bringing 
an extra value to its adoption. 
VII. FUTURE WORK 
As outlined above, a method for ensuring completeness and 
non-redundancy of a policy specification is desired. The 
method should also include a formalization of the 
communication-based description language for aiding precise 
specifications. 
Additionally, another dimension of data referring to context 
is desired in the metamodel for signaling overall states of the 
system, such as “Wednesday” or “raining”, to be controlled by 
special system requests included in the workflow. Other 
changes allowing a more direct modeling of RBAC and role 
administration as well as simplifying safe subdivision of 
analysis are also intended. 
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